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I.

INTRODUCTION

As a teenager, my vinyl record collection contained such classics as
the Beach Boys’ “Surfin’ USA” and George Harrison’s “My Sweet
Lord.” These and other songs were readily available at the Music Staff,
a local record store that was one of the most popular hangouts of my
youth. Even though both of these songs have been found to infringe the
musical compositions of “Sweet Little Sixteen”1 and “He’s So Fine,”2
respectively, my purchase and ownership of albums containing these
songs never subjected me to copyright-infringement liability. Indeed,
when the Chiffons sued George Harrison for copyright infringement in
the 1970s for plagiarizing their musical composition of “He’s So Fine,”3
neither party—nor anyone else—would have envisioned that the
purchasers of Harrison’s All Things Must Pass album,4 which included
“My Sweet Lord,”5 would be considered infringers merely because they
obtained a phonorecord6 of the sound recording, even though “My Sweet
*
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1. Chuck Berry Biography, THE ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF FAME AND MUSEUM,
http://rockhall.com/inductees/chuck-berry/bio/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (discussing Chuck Berry’s
infringement suit against the Beach Boys).
2. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
3. Id. at 178.
4. GEORGE HARRISON, ALL THINGS MUST PASS (Capitol Records 1970).
5. Id.
6. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, sound recordings are fixed in “phonorecords”; other
works are fixed as “copies.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). “‘Phonorecords’ are material objects in which
sounds . . . are fixed by any method . . . and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. . . . [This definition]
includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.” Id. “The term ‘copies’ includes the
material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.” Id.; see also LondonSire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 n.14 (D. Mass. 2008) (“The two terms [copy
and phonorecord] appear to be functionally interchangeable . . . differing only in the nature of the
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Lord” was an unauthorized copy and adaptation of the Chiffons’ musical
composition. The mere act of purchasing a material copy or a
phonorecord7 does not infringe any of a copyright owner’s enumerated
rights under either the Copyright Act of 19098 or the Copyright Act of
1976 (the 1976 Act).9
The advent and rapid growth of online music retailers has provided
musicians new avenues to sell their songs. Artists can digitally save their
sound recordings as MP3 files.10 An artist may release these files
through online stores like iTunes, where consumers may access, pay for,
and make an authorized copy of a song.11 One expected result of online
legal music downloading has been its effect on brick-and-mortar record
stores and CD manufacturers. In the last five years, many music retailers
have closed, including Tower Records,12 Sam Goody,13 and a multitude
of smaller music proprietorships.14 Sony has shut down and consolidated
copyrighted work.”) (citing H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5666).
7. This would also apply to purchases of the musical composition in the form of sheet music or
fixed as a copy in any other form. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
8. The district court decided Harrisongs in 1976, prior to the January 1, 1978 effective date of
the Copyright Act of 1976. 420 F. Supp. at 177; see also Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598–99 (1976) (noting effective date of Jan. 1, 1978) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006)). Under the Copyright Act of 1909, copyright owners had
the exclusive rights to “print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend” the work; to translate the work into
other languages or dialects; to publicly perform or display the work; and to produce and distribute
the work. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 superseded by 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006). A consumer purchasing, receiving, or possessing a copy of a
copyrighted work does not infringe any of these rights.
9. The six enumerated rights of copyright owners under the Copyright Act of 1976 are the
reproduction right, the adaptation right, the distribution right, the public-display and publicperformance rights, and, for sound recordings, the digital-broadcast right. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
Purchasing a phonorecord—the physical embodiment of a sound recording—does not fall into any
of these categories.
10. MP3 is one of the dominant audio files types used in downloading. Musical sounds can be
turned into a digital form and recorded onto a compact disc (CD). But in the format on CDs, three
minutes of a sound recording translates to a 30 megabyte file, or 30 million bytes of data, which may
be too large for downloading. What Are MP3 Files and How Do They Work?, HOW STUFF WORKS,
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/question118.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2011). To compress
that large song file into a smaller format that is more quickly downloaded, the Moving Picture
Experts Group (MPEG) developed a compression system for sound recordings called MPEG Audio
Layer-3, or MP3, which “can compress a song by a factor of 10 or 12 and still retain something close
to CD quality.” Id. Therefore, that 30-megabyte sound file from a CD reduces to about 3 megabytes
in MP3 format. Id.
11. See, e.g., iTunes, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
12. The Day Music Died? No, but Tower Records Is, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 15, 2006, 9:43 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15251144/ns/business-us_business/.
13. Greg Sandoval, More Consolidation Among Major Music Labels? CNET NEWS (Jan. 20,
2011, 6:54 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20029136-261.html.
14. Justin Pope, Record Stores Closing in U.S. at Record Rates, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 30,
2008, 12:08 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695265521/Record-stores-closing-in-US-at-
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CD manufacturing facilities.15 In 2009, downloaded music accounted for
98% of all individual songs sold, and 12% of all albums sold.16
Recent scholarship has addressed digital-music issues such as peerto-peer unauthorized downloading of songs,17 the future of online music
distribution,18 tactics used by the entertainment industry to curtail
unauthorized copying,19 and the social acceptability of music sampling.20
Still, there is a lurking issue yet to be addressed: one unintended
consequence of the ability to sell songs through downloads is a new, and
yet unnoticed, way to infringe copyrights, which, unless remedied, could

record-rates.html.
15. William Fenton, Report: Sony Shutting Down CD Manufacturing Plant in N.J.,
PCMAG.COM (Jan. 13, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2375682,00.asp.
16. Lexton Snol, Single Track Downloads Dominate, PCWORLD (Jan. 30, 2011, 10:04 AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/218172/single_track_downloads_dominate.html.
The overall
number of albums sold in any form, CD or digital, has declined 7% between 2007 and 2009, while—
thanks to the ability to download individual songs rather than purchase an entire album—the number
of singles sold has grown 76%. Id.; see also Caitlin Kenney, Album Sales Hit Record Lows. Again.,
NPR (Aug. 26, 2010 1:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2010/08/25/129428450/albumsales-hit-record-lows.
17. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for
Resolving Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2005) (discussing
peer-to-peer file sharing and related copyright issues); Chad A. Sanders, Note, Maverick Recording
Co. v. Whitney Harper: How the Fifth Circuit Virtually Eliminated Innocent Infringers Without
Noticing, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 295 (2010) (analyzing case dealing with peer-to-peer
file sharing and copyright infringement).
18. See, e.g., Robert J. Delchin, Music Copyright Law: Past, Present and Future of Online
Music Distribution, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343 (2004) (discussing legal developments in
online music distribution).
19. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373 (2010) (discussing
entertainment industry tactics to address online copyright infringement); Jordana Boag, Comment,
The Battle of Piracy versus Privacy: How the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) Is
Using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) As Its Weapon Against Internet Users’ Privacy
Rights, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 241 (2004) (discussing RIAA counter-piracy efforts); Kate Cross,
Comment, David v. Goliath: How the Record Industry Is Winning Substantial Judgments Against
Individuals for Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1031 (2010) (analyzing
damages in suits brought by the RIAA).
20. See, e.g., KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND
CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011) (discussing the history, licensing, and future of music
sampling); Mark A. Edwards, Acceptable Deviance and Property Rights, 43 CONN. L. REV. 457
(2010) (discussing divergences between social acceptability and legality of behavior with regard to
property rights); Michael J. Madison, Intellectual Property and Americana, or Why IP Gets the
Blues, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 677, 702–03 (2008) (noting effect of
intellectual property law on “the arc of . . . blues [music] and its descendants”); David Mongillo, The
Girl Talk Dilemma: Can Copyright Law Accommodate New Forms of Sample-Based Music?, 9 PITT.
J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2009) (discussing copyright-infringement issues related to audio sampling);
Jeffrey Omari, Mix and Mash: The Digital Sampling of Music Has Stretched the Meaning of the Fair
Use Defense, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 35 (discussing recent developments in music sampling
disputes).
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lead to new classes of defendants never contemplated in the 1976 Act’s
protections for artists, musicians, and authors.
Unlike a brick-and-mortar transaction, the act of purchasing a song
on the web requires that the purchaser “download” a digital file of the
song—that is, make a copy of the song that is located on the vendor’s
website and transfer that copy to the consumer’s computer. Thus,
downloading copies and phonorecords triggers copyright protections
every time a consumer purchases and downloads a song from an online
music retailer.21 The consumer benefits at the expense of one of the
rights of the copyright owner—the reproduction right.22 Of course, by
making one’s song available for download, the copyright owner allows
for such a reproduction.
But suppose the downloaded song is later the subject of an
infringement suit regarding the melody or lyrics in the underlying
musical composition.23 Every time the alleged infringer’s musical
composition—which is fixed in the digital file of the sound recording—is
downloaded, the purchaser of the downloaded file has made an
unauthorized reproduction of an unauthorized adaptation of the
plaintiff’s musical work. To borrow from the Harrisongs example,
George Harrison’s “My Sweet Lord” constituted an unauthorized
adaptation of the Chiffons’ “He’s So Fine.”24 Thus, a consumer’s
download of “My Sweet Lord” would be an unauthorized reproduction
of an unauthorized adaptation of “He’s So Fine.”
While the Chiffons and Harrison resolved their litigation decades
ago—leaving purchasers of “My Sweet Lord” safe from liability—rapper
Biz Markie faced an infringement suit in the 1990s25 and rapper 50 Cent
was recently sued for allegedly taking another artist’s instrumental.26

21. Because downloading music, videos, or movies from a peer-to-peer network creates an
unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted work, the downloading party may incur copyrightinfringement liability. See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) (detailing logistics of peer-to-peer file sharing).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).
23. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“A
copier will be liable for copying the musical work in its entirety, that is, the composition’s words and
music together, as well as for copying just the music or the words alone.” (citing PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT § 2.8 (2d ed. 1996))).
24. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
25. See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
26. Rich Jones, 50 Cent Sued for Copyright Infringement Over “I Get Money”, ASSOCIATED
CONTENT FROM YAHOO! (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/6162288/50_
cent_sued_for_copyright_infringement.html?cat=33.
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This may expose online purchasers of both rappers’ works to infringement
liability.27
In 1991, Biz Markie was found to have infringed Gilbert
O’Sullivan’s musical composition, “Alone Again (Naturally).”28 Markie
admitted to sampling a portion of O’Sullivan’s work for use in his song
“Alone Again.”29 O’Sullivan ultimately enjoined Markie’s use of the
sampling.30 The district court rejected the defendants’ argument that the
pervasiveness of music sampling in the rap industry should excuse the
infringement.31
In the case of 50 Cent,32 his song “I Get Money” is currently the
subject of dispute in litigation with Caliber, another rap artist.33 Caliber
claims that the instrumental in 50 Cent’s song infringes Caliber’s
copyright ownership of the track.34 “I Get Money” went double
platinum,35 selling over two million copies as either a single or as a track
on the album Curtis.36 Even if only half of those purchases were
downloads, that translates to one million consumers infringing Caliber’s
reproduction right. The combined statutory damages that Caliber could
collect would range between $750 million and $30 billion.37 It may only
27. See infra Part III for a detailed discussion.
28. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185.
29. Id. at 183 (“Defendants admit ‘that the Biz Markie album “I Need A Haircut” embodies the
rap recording “Alone Again” which uses three words from “Alone Again (Naturally)” composed by
Gilbert O’Sullivan and a portion of the music taken from the O’Sullivan recording.’”). For an
explanation of sampling see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 886 (6th
Cir. 2004) (explaining that “[s]ampling, common in rap, hip-hop, and urban music, typically
involves making a digital copy from a master sound recording and using a piece in the making of a
new work”). For a detailed discussion of the legal issues involved in sampling, see Carlos Ruiz de la
Torre, Digital Music Sampling and Copyright Law: Can the Interests of Copyright Owners and
Sampling Artists Be Recorded?, 7 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 401 (2005); Stephen R. Wilson, Music
Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De Minimis Defense?, 1 J. HIGH TECH.
L. 179 (2002).
30. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185.
31. Id. at 183 (“[T]he defendants in this action . . . would have this court believe that stealing is
rampant in the music business and, for that reason, their conduct here should be excused. The
conduct of the defendants herein, however, violates not only the Seventh Commandment, but also
the copyright laws of this country.”).
32. 50 Cent is the performing name of Curtis James Jackson III. 50 Cent, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/50_Cent (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
33. Jones, supra note 26.
34. Id.
35. I Get Money, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Get_Money (last visited Feb. 1,
2011).
36. See Certification Criteria, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS’N OF AM., http://www.riaa.com/
goldandplatinum.php?content_selector=criteria (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). The Statutory Damages provision of the 1976 Act states that:
[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an
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be a matter of time before the copyright holders of musical compositions
sue consumers over downloads of songs that are the subject of
infringement suits.
Through the Internet, copyright infringement has taken on new
dimensions never foreseen by the legislators who enacted the 1976 Act.
In an effort to address this overlooked area of potential liability, this
Article urges legislative action. Rather than waiting for the courts to find
a downstream defendant liable under such circumstances,38 Congress
should shield innocent consumers from liability for statutory damages for
purchasing copies of songs they thought they were legally allowed to
own.
This Article approaches this dilemma by first describing the state of
“traditional” copyright infringement in the brick-and-mortar world in
Part II. Part III details how copyright infringement on the Internet
diverges from the traditional mode based on the difference in how the
work is fixed and purchased. It also illustrates how downstream
infringement by the consumer occurs through the downloading of an
infringing song from a legitimate music retailer—an act that is several
steps removed from the original infringement by the defendantmusician.39 This section then discusses the effects of these internet
purchases on a class of third-party infringers: those musician-defendants
who create infringing works and provide sound recordings for download.
Part IV addresses public policy that supports reducing the liability of
downstream copyright infringers and foretells some ramifications of
award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to
any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually . . . in a sum of not less
than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.
Id. Engaging in some simple math shows that if one million music lovers downloaded an infringing
song, such as “I Get Money,” then the plaintiff—in this instance, Caliber—could receive anywhere
between $750 million and $30 billion if he was able to collect from every person who infringed.
There is, however, some relief for the “innocent” infringer:
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such
infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory
damages to a sum of not less than $200.
Id. § 504(c)(2). If every consumer defended herself in court and met this burden, Caliber would
collect a minimum of $200 million. See infra Parts III and IV for further discussion on innocent
infringers and a proposed modification of this section of the statute.
38. Alternatively, courts could find that consumers are not subject to liability—even though
copyright infringement is a tort of strict liability—under the 1976 Act. See infra Part III.
39. If one considers the original act of infringement to be the creation of the unauthorized
derivative work by the defendant composer or musician, then the sound recording of that infringing
work would be one step removed; distributing the sound recording to online music retailers would be
two steps removed from the original infringing activity. The distribution by the online retailer would
be three steps away, and, finally, the purchase and download by the consumer would be four steps
downstream from the original infringing act.
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allowing these suits to proceed. Part V then proposes solutions to shield
consumers from downstream-infringement liability.
This Article
concludes with final thoughts on the necessity of ensuring that
consumers are not caught in the legitimate web of composers protecting
their musical compositions, and how allowing infringement actions
against unforeseen downstream defendants can affect overall fidelity to
the rule of law.
II. BUYING THAT INFRINGING CD AT THE SWAP MEET
In order to frame the discussion on why consumers who are
downstream from the infringing activity should not be held liable for the
actions of upstream infringing musicians, some historical context proves
useful. Prior to the advent of music downloading from the Internet, one
could only obtain an authorized phonorecord of a sound recording by
visiting a brick-and-mortar store or other retailer40 and purchasing the
material object—such as a vinyl record, cassette, eight-track tape, or
CD—in which the sound recording was “fixed.” Through this world
view, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976. This section,
therefore, first explores the liabilities faced by a consumer who legally
purchases a material object that embodies an infringing musical
composition.
A. Civil Liability Under the Copyright Act
Going to a store and purchasing a CD containing either an authorized
or unauthorized phonorecord does not involve any of the enumerated
rights under § 106 of the Copyright Act.41 The consumer has not copied
the musical composition or sound recording and fixed that copy in a
tangible medium of expression. She has not distributed a material object
containing the copyrighted work, and she has not made an adaptation of
or publicly broadcast the songs contained on the CD. Even if the seller
of the CD infringes one of these rights, the purchaser does not. Thus, in
the brick-and-mortar world, consumers do not infringe a copyright
owner’s rights when they purchase a material object, even if it embodies
an unauthorized copy or phonorecord. 42
40. As a young woman, I also frequently purchased music at “swap meets,” flea markets, and
garage sales. While some of these venues probably sold pirated music, most also sold a large
quantity of new and used authorized phonorecords.
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
42. See id. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
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A brick-and-mortar sale of the infringing 50 Cent CD infringes the
distribution rights of Caliber and subjects the retailer to strict liability.43
And the musician who wrote and recorded the infringing song may also
incur liability for (1) vicarious or (2) contributory infringement based on
the actions of the retailer.
To prove vicarious liability, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
“has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has
a direct financial interest in such activities.”44 No knowledge of the
infringing activity is required.45 The musician who has recorded an
infringing song and distributes it—either directly or through a record
label—has both actual control over the sale of those phonorecords and a
definite financial interest in their sale.
To be held liable for contributory infringement, two elements must
be proven: (1) that a defendant has “knowledge of the infringing
activity”; and (2) that the defendant “induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”46 Again, in addition to
facing direct liability, the musician who wrote and recorded the
infringing song could incur third-party liability on the theory of
contributory infringement. The infringer-musician has knowledge of the
music store’s distribution of the infringing phonorecord and materially
contributes by providing the phonorecord for sale in the record store.
The infringing musician may also face a claim of inducing copyright
infringement; however, “the standard for inducement liability is
providing a service ‘with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright.’
‘[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or actual
as provided by sections 106 through 122 . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as
the case may be.”), invalidated in part by Nat. Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents, 633
F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011) (declaring § 501(a) unconstitutional to the extent it conflicts with state
sovereign immunity).
43. See id. § 106(3) (giving the owner of a copyright the exclusive right to authorize
distribution of copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale). Suits of this
nature are not unprecedented; in the 1980s, several small music retail stores were sued for
distributing unauthorized copies of CDs. See generally Stan Soocher, He’s The No. 1 Bane of
Pirates: CD Copies Worry the Music Business, NAT’L L.J., June 19, 1989, at 2.
44. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); Case
Note, Television Sponsor and Advertising Agency Held Vicariously Liable for Copyright
Infringement—Davis v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 64 MICH. L. REV. 1172, 1175–78 (1966));
see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996).
45. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 307 (“When the right and ability to supervise
coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials—
even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired—the
purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary
of that exploitation.” (citation omitted) (citing De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944))).
46. Gershwin Publ’g, 443 F.2d at 1162 (footnote omitted) (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968)).
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infringing uses would not be enough here to subject [a defendant] to
liability.’”47 A musician’s liability for inducing the record store to
infringe on the copyright owner’s distribution right will depend on
proving that the musician took “‘active steps . . . to encourage direct
infringement,’ such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to
engage in an infringing use.”48 This may be difficult to prove—the
musician’s goals are to create music and make money, not to induce
record stores to infringe.49
B. Criminal Liability
Currently, federal prosecutors target primarily manufacturers,
distributors, and transporters50 of bootlegged51 and pirated52 goods.
Prosecutors have attempted to use the National Stolen Property Act,53
which criminalizes the interstate transportation of stolen property, to
target transporters of bootlegged, pirated, and counterfeit goods.54 The
Supreme Court, however, held that the transportation of bootleg
phonorecords did not fall within the reach of § 2314’s definition of
“stolen goods.”55

47. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 801 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 936–37 (2005)).
48. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (citation omitted) (quoting Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs.
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). “[A] showing that infringement was encouraged
overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product
suitable for some lawful use.” Id.
49. For a finding of inducement, there would have to be “evidence of express promotion,
marketing, and intent to promote further, [and] the business models employed by” the musician
would have to show that her principal object for providing the sound recordings to record stores was
for the purposes of infringing on the plaintiff’s musical work. Id. at 926.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006).
51. According to the Supreme Court, “[a] ‘bootleg’ phonorecord is one which contains an
unauthorized copy of a commercially unreleased performance.” Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S.
207, 209 n.2 (1985).
52. A “pirated” phonorecord refers to “an unauthorized copy of a performance already
commercially released,” id., “but with new packaging.” Soocher, supra note 43, at 2. A
“counterfeit” is a “duplication of not only previously released sound recordings, but [of] also the
original packaging.” Id. at 2. As noted by the Court in Dowling, the terms “bootleg” and “pirated”
are often used interchangeably. 473 U.S. at 209 n.2.
53. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 208.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006). For further discussion regarding the growth of unauthorized
sound recordings, see David Schwartz, Note, Strange Fixation: Bootleg Sound Recordings Enjoy the
Benefits of Improving Technology, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 611 (1995).
55. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 216.
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Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, declared that
“interference with copyright does not . . . equate with theft, conversion,
or fraud. The [1976 Act] even employs a separate term of art to define
one who misappropriates a copyright.”56 The Court elaborated on the
difference between theft or conversion of a physical object and
infringement of a copyright:
The infringer invades a statutorily defined province guaranteed to the
copyright holder alone. But he does not assume physical control over
the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its owner of its use. While
one may colloquially liken infringement with some general notion of
wrongful appropriation, infringement plainly implicates a more
complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft,
conversion, or fraud.57

Today, a transporter of bootleg phonorecords could face prosecution
under the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982.58 There
is, however, no criminal liability for the purchasers of unauthorized
copies or phonorecords. Section 506(a) provides that:
Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall be punished as
provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the infringement was
committed—
(A) for the purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain;
(B) by the reproduction or distribution . . . of 1 or more copies or
phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail
value of more than $1,000; or
(C) by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial
distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible

56. Id. at 217.
57. Id. at 217–18. State courts have also found that statutes criminalizing the possession of
stolen property do not encompass the possession of materials that contain infringing works. See,
e.g., People v. Borriello, 587 N.Y.S.2d 518, 522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1992) (noting that under the
alternative view “a person who purchases a duplicate of a ‘Gucci’ or ‘Dior’ or some other designer
item, which the person has reason to believe is unauthorized, would commit the crime of possessing
stolen property”).
58. Pub. L. No 97-180, 96 Stat. 91, 93 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006)). The
Supreme Court noted that the government conceded this point in its opposition of Dowling’s petition
for a writ of certiorari by “acknowledg[ing] that it no longer need[ed] § 2314 to prosecute and
punish serious copyright infringement” and could instead rely on this new statute. Dowling, 473
U.S. at 228 n.21.
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to members of the public, if such person knew or should have
known that the work was intended for commercial distribution.59

Other provisions in the federal criminal code similarly punish traffickers
and those who make unauthorized fixations or distributions, but not those
who receive the goods.60
III. MUSIC IN THE INTERNET ERA
The 1998 launch of the website Ritmoteca.com revolutionized the
acquisition of sound recordings by consumers.61 No longer were
consumers limited to the selection at the local record shop; the universe
of available genres became almost infinite. Online music stores have
made it easier for consumers to purchase music from both well-known
and obscure artists; new and unknown bands now have the ability to find
an audience for their music.
In a brick-and-mortar transaction, a consumer does not make a copy
when she buys a song; rather, she purchases a material object which
embodies a phonorecord of the copyrighted work. Internet stores such as
iTunes, CD Universe, and Amazon.com work differently—they sell
songs via downloads. “A download is a transmission of an electronic file
containing a digital copy of a musical work62 that is sent from an on-line
server to a local hard drive.”63 Under the Copyright Act, this
59. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (emphasis added).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006) (providing criminal sanctions for violations of 17 U.S.C. §
506); id. § 2319A (criminalizing the unauthorized fixation, transmission, and distribution of sound
recordings and music videos of live musical performances); id. § 2319B (criminalizing the
“[u]nauthorized recording of Motion pictures in a Motion picture exhibition facility” (emphasis
added)); id. § 2320 (criminalizing “[t]rafficking in counterfeit goods or services” (emphasis added)).
For the most part, states are preempted from enacting similar laws. See, e.g., People v. Williams,
920 N.E.2d 446, 457 (Ill. 2009) (holding that the Illinois criminal statute regarding piracy of sound
recordings was preempted by the Federal Copyright Act). Several states have managed to enact
similar statutes that have survived preemption challenges. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 734, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a statute criminalizing the advertising, offering, or
possessing for sale of pirated recordings or audiovisual works is not preempted by federal law). But
none of these address the unknowing purchase or possession of unauthorized copies or
phonorecords. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653w (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-60 (West
2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21 (West 2005).
61. Ritmoteca.com is credited with being one of the first online music stores. Online Music
Store, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_music_store (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
62. Under the 1976 Act, musical works are copyrightable subject matter. 17 U.S.C. §
102(a)(2); see also Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(“It is well-established that ‘musical works, including any accompanying words,’ may be
copyrighted under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).”).
63. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir.
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downloaded electronic file is considered a material object.64 “The
Copyright Act . . . does not use materiality in its most obvious sense—to
mean a tangible object with a certain heft, like a book or compact disc.
Rather, it refers to materiality as a medium in which a copyrighted work
can be ‘fixed.’”65
Thus, any object in which a sound recording can be fixed is a “material
object.” That includes . . . electronic files . . . . [For example, w]hen a
user on a peer-to-peer network downloads a song from another user, he
receives into his computer a digital sequence representing the sound
recording. That sequence is magnetically encoded on a segment of his
hard disk (or likewise written on other media.) With the right hardware
and software, the downloader can use the magnetic sequence to
reproduce the sound recording. The electronic file (or, perhaps more
accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard disk) is therefore a
“phonorecord” within the meaning of the [1976 Act].66

Thus, “the delivery of a music file to a purchaser via a download
constitutes a mechanical reproduction of the copyrighted work in the
form of a ‘digital phonorecord delivery’ as set forth in 17 U.S.C. §
115(d).”67
Purchasing a song online requires an authorized copying of that song
from the music store’s website or server onto the customer’s computer.68
2010) (citing United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438,
411 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
64. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 170–71 (D. Mass. 2008)
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
65. Id. at 171 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). The Copyright Act provides that “‘[a] work is “fixed”
in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, . . . is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration.’” 17 U.S.C. § 101. “The sole purpose of the term
‘material object’ is to provide a reference point for the terms ‘phonorecords’ and ‘fixed.’” LondonSire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 171.
66. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101); accord Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d
693, 703–04 (2d Cir. 1998); Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir.
1998); WORKING GRP. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 213 (1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/
doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf (noting that electronic transmissions implicate copyright holders’ rights and
strongly implying that electronic files constitute “material objects”).
67. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 447; see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 115(c)(3)(G)(i) (“A digital phonorecord delivery of a sound recording is actionable as an act of
infringement . . . unless (I) the digital phonorecord delivery has been authorized by the copyright
owner of the sound recording, and (II) . . . has otherwise been authorized by the copyright owner of
the musical work to distribute or authorize the distribution, by means of a digital phonorecord
delivery, of each musical work embodied in the sound recording.”).
68. See Stenograph, 144 F.3d at 100 (“The language of the Copyright Act, case law, and
common sense support the proposition that the installation of software onto a computer results in
‘copying’ within the meaning of the [1976 Act].” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101; 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08[A][1], at 8-113 (1997))); Vault Corp. v. Quaid
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A consumer could reasonably assume that the songs on the legitimate
online music store available for purchase are there with the permission of
the copyright owners and that any copying done in conjunction with the
transaction is an authorized reproduction—that is, upon payment, the
consumer has the permission of the copyright owner to create and
download a copy.69
A. Consumers as Downstream Infringers
Suppose, however, the purchased song is infringing on another
musical composition. Since copyright infringement is a tort of strict
liability, “a plaintiff need not prove wrongful intent or culpability in
order to prevail . . . . Even an innocent copier—for example, one who
copies in the belief that the infringed work is in the public domain or
without realizing that he or she is copying—is liable . . . .”70 It does not
matter even if the “innocent” copier had obtained an explicit warrant that
use of the material would not infringe anyone’s rights.71 Thus, under this
strict liability standard, even these “innocent” downstream infringers—
that is, those who are unaware that they are downloading an unauthorized
copy of a song—are liable for infringement. One might think that the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) would not pursue
these claims. They are not, however, above suing twelve-year-old girls72
or the deceased.73
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he act of loading a program from a medium of
storage into a computer’s memory creates a copy of the program.”).
69. Even without express permission, the downloading could be interpreted to be a § 117(a)(1)
exception. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided that such a new copy or adaptation is
created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine
and that it is used in no other manner.”).
70. Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Intent
does, however, play a role in determining remedies:
[L]ack of culpability may bear on statutory damages where those are in issue. . . . In
consequence, there is no proper role for proof of wilfulness [regarding liability]. Its only
function would be in service of an attempt by plaintiff to prejudice the jury’s assessment
of damages and, if it proves to be in issue, liability by portraying defendants in an
unflattering light.
Id. (footnote omitted).
71. See Bryant v. Europadisk, Ltd., No. 07 Civ 3050(WGY), 2009 WL 1059777, at *5–6
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2009); see also De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1944).
72. 12-Year-Old Settles Music Swap Lawsuit, CNN (Feb. 18, 2004), http://articles.cnn.com/
2003-09-09/tech/music.swap.settlement_1_riaa-cary-sherman-kazaa?_s=PM:TECH.
73. Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, REGISTER (Feb. 5, 2005, 2:30 AM)
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa_sues_the_dead/.
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For “innocent” infringers who can prove a good-faith belief that they
were not infringing, there is a reduction in statutory damages:
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and
the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to
believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the
court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a
sum of not less than $200.74

This relief, however, was not designed to limit the damages to
downstream consumer infringers—rather, it was designed to help
publishers and broadcasters who printed, distributed, or publicly
performed a work under the mistaken assumption that they had
permission to do so.75 The legislative history shows that Congress
recognized infringement liability’s potential to stifle the public’s access
to creative works.76 Thus, Congress sought to encourage publishers and
broadcasters to take chances on new works by withholding any undue
punishment from the 1976 Act.
Downstream infringement of this nature casts a wide net. Millions
of customers could incur liability because they purchased and
downloaded a song whose musical composition infringed on another’s
work. For example, suppose Caliber wins his infringement lawsuit
against 50 Cent. Caliber would then have claims against both retail
outlets—brick-and-mortar and online—for unauthorized distribution of
an unauthorized adaptation of Caliber’s song77 and every consumer who
purchased a download of the song through the online retailers for
unauthorized reproduction.78

74. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
75. S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 145 (1975).
The “innocent infringer” provision of section 504(c)(2) has been the subject of extensive
discussion. The exception, which would allow reduction of minimum statutory damages
to $100[, which has since been raised to $200,] where the infringer “was not aware and
had no reason to believe that his acts constituted an infringement of copyright,” is
sufficient to protect against unwarranted liability in cases of occasional or isolated
innocent infringement, and it offers adequate insulation to users, such as broadcasters and
newspaper publishers, who are particularly vulnerable to this type of infringement suit.
On the other hand, by establishing a realistic floor for liability, the provision preserves its
intended deterrent effect; and it would not allow a defendant to escape simply because the
plaintiff failed to disprove his claim of innocence.
Id.
76. Id.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
78. Id. § 106(1).
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Individually suing every consumer who downloaded “I Get Money”
would be onerous; the song sold over two million copies.79 With such a
multitude of defendants for a single song, a copyright owner such as
Caliber might seek to certify all of the purchasers of an infringing song
as a defendant class.80 A defendant class action occurs when a plaintiff
“name[s] a defendant representative to defend the interests of a class of
unnamed potential defendants.”81 While rare, suits involving classaction defendants have been certified.82
A copyright owner such as Caliber would have to meet the
requirements of Rule 23 under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class; and

79. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
80. A “class action” suit is one
in which the court authorizes a single person or a small group of people to represent the
interests of a larger group; [specifically, it is] a lawsuit in which the convenience either of
the public or of the interested parties requires that the case be settled through litigation by
or against only a part of the group of similarly situated persons and in which a person
whose interests are or may be affected does not have an opportunity to protect his or her
interests by appearing personally or through a personally selected representative, or
through a person specially appointed to act as a trustee or guardian.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (9th ed. 2009).
81. James M. Underwood, Road to Nowhere or Jurisprudential U-Turn? The Intersection of
Punitive Damage Class Actions and the Due Process Clause, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763, 780
n.96 (2009) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)). This form of class action has its origins in English
Chancery courts’ bills of peace “where a plaintiff sued several defendants as a class.” Nelson
Rodrigues Netto, The Optimal Law Enforcement with Mandatory Defendant Class Action 33 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 59, 77 (2007). A bill of peace “could resolve a controversy between an individual,
the adversary, and several persons (called the multitude), where there were common questions of law
or fact, or both, involving each and every one of them, and where there was no basis for a party
joinder under the common law.” Id. at 77 n.55.
82. See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 610 (1989) (noting certification of case as
a defendant class action); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4 n.1 (1979)
(noting the district court’s certification of the case) (citing 400 F. Supp. 737, 741 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1975)); In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 354 F.3d 1246, 1264 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming certification
of case as a defendant class action).
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(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.83

In addition, Rule 23(b) specifies the types of class actions that “may be
maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied.”84
If Caliber were to file a suit against a class of defendants, a court
may, in fact, certify the class.85 First, the class could have over one
million members; therefore, joinder of all members would be
impracticable. Second, the questions of law or fact are common to all
the members of the class—all class members downloaded a song from a
music retailer’s website. Third, the questions of law or fact—
infringement based on downloading an infringing song—are common to
the class, as are the claims or defenses of the representative parties. The
prong that creates the most difficulty for Caliber is the requirement that
those individuals whom he chooses to be “the representative parties
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”86 Caliber would
also have to contend with the notice requirements;87 this may be
achieved, however, by subpoenaing the online music retailer’s records,
which should contain the names and addresses of customers who
purchased the song.
The class members who do not opt out would be represented by the
class counsel,88 who would likely claim “innocent infringement,” which,
if successful, could reduce statutory damages from $750 per defendant to
$200 each.89 It is unlikely that a single defendant would hire an attorney
to have her damages reduced by $550; therefore, class certification may

83. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (emphasis added); see also Labrador v. Seattle Mortg. Co., No. 082270 SC, 2010 WL 3768378, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2010) (setting out legal standard for class
certification).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
85. A court would most likely certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3), which allows class-action
certification when “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
A Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class may also be appropriate, however, where individual actions may
cause “inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.”
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
87. If a court were to certify under Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2), then “the court may direct
appropriate notice to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). For a class certification under Rule
23(b)(3), “the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort.” Since Caliber would likely subpoena the contact information from the online retailer,
individual notice to all members would be possible.
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
89. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
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be in the best interest of the defendants in terms of reducing their
monetary liability.90
Should Caliber succeed in his class action suit, he would need to
collect the statutory damages from all of the members of defendant class.
Caliber has already acquired the names and addresses of all those
persons who purchased and downloaded the infringing song for the
purposes of serving notice. After a court enters judgment in favor of
Caliber, he could probably seek a court order directing the online retailer
to charge the statutory damages to the defendant class members’ credit
cards. It is unclear whether this would be successful.
Large record producers may be hesitant to alienate their customers
by filing infringement actions against them. But an individual musician
could see such an action as his “meal ticket.” The musician may never
have a hit song himself, but could “hit the lottery” by suing the one
million customers who downloaded a hit song that had infringed his
copyright.
B. Musicians as Inducers?
A musician who has created an infringing musical work and made a
sound recording of that work available for download might also face
third-party-infringement liability through the doctrines of vicarious
liability, contributory infringement, and inducement.91 Of course, a
direct infringement must precede an indirect infringement—in the
situation at hand, this is the consumer who downloads the infringing
song. In our example, 50 Cent may not only have direct-infringement
liability, but the distribution by the online retailers and downloading of
his song by customers—both of whom are direct infringers—may subject
him to third-party liability.
To prove vicarious liability, Caliber would need to show that 50 Cent
“ha[d] the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also
ha[d] a direct financial interest in such activities.”92 50 Cent had the
right and ability to stop the infringing activity by removing his song from
90. If Caliber were to certify one million defendants in the class, then the court could reduce the
damages from $750 million to $200 million.
91. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
92. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); Case Note,
Television Sponsor and Advertising Agency Held Vicariously Liable for Copyright Infringement—
Davis v. E. I. DuPont de NeMours & Co., 64 MICH. L. REV. 1172, 1175–78 (1966)); see also
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gershwin Publ’g,
443 F.2d at 1162).

18

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

the retail websites. And he had a financial interest in the infringing
activity—he stands to profit from every online sale and download of the
infringing song.
50 Cent may also be liable for contributory infringement if, “with
knowledge of the infringing activity, [he] induce[d], cause[d,] or
materially contribute[d] to the infringing conduct of another.”93 50 Cent
would know about the infringing activity—downloading the songs—
because he is aware that the songs are available for sale online. After all,
he—or his agents—negotiated with the online retailer for the song’s
presence on the website for sale and download. By this same reasoning,
50 Cent would also have materially contributed to the consumers’
infringing conduct. In fact, it was his purpose to have the song
purchased by the general public, even if he did not consider such
purchases to be infringing activities. On the other hand, Caliber would
face some difficulty proving that 50 Cent induced customers to infringe
Caliber’s copyright, no different from his attempts to show that 50 Cent
induced a brick-and-mortar record store to infringe.94
Just like a brick-and-mortar store, an online music retailer, such as
iTunes or Amazon.com, would face infringement liability as the
distributors of an infringing musical work.95 One could argue that the
sale by the online music retailer and the purchase and download by the
consumer is one act of infringement; however, these could also be
considered two separate acts of infringement. The 1976 Act provides
that:
[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all
infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for
which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or
more infringers are liable jointly and severally . . . .96

93. Gershwin Publ’g, 443 F.2d at 1162 (footnote omitted) (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396–97 (1968)).
94. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006); see also U.S. Media Corp. v. Edde Entm’t Corp., No. 94 CIV.
4849(MBM)MHD, 1998 WL 401532, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1998). “If several defendants
participate in a transaction or series of transactions that brings about [a copyright] infringement, they
will be held jointly and severally liable for plaintiff’s lost profits.” U.S. Media, 1998 WL 401532, at
*8 (citing Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467, 472 (2d Cir. 1985); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1981)). However, the defendants in U.S. Media were suppliers,
distributors, and retailers of a single infringing product—there were no defendant consumers. Id. at
*1. Cf. Bouchat v. Champion Prods., Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 537, 553 (D. Md. 2003) (holding that a
plaintiff would be entitled to a single statutory damages award for which the primary infringer would
be jointly and severally liable with derivative infringers).
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Therefore, if the act of purchasing and downloading the song from an
online music retailer comprises a single infringement, then the consumer
and the retailer would incur joint and several liability; the plaintiff
musician would not be able to collect from both defendants.97 If,
however, the distribution by the online music retailer and the copying by
the customer constitute two separate acts of infringement, then the
plaintiff musician could collect separately from each defendant.
Unlike a brick-and-mortar store, however, an online music retailer
may seek protection under the safe-harbor provision in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which would provide immunity
from monetary liability.98 But this would most likely fail because of the
inapplicability of several requisite conditions.
First, an online music retailer would have to qualify as a “service
provider”99 by showing it is “a provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”100 The online music retailer
likely falls under the category of “a provider of online services,” thus
meeting the definition.
Section 512(c) provides the most plausible safe harbor for an online
music retailer, limiting liability for service providers with “[i]nformation
residing on systems or networks at direction of users.”101 Per subsection
(c)(1), “[a] service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief . . . for
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a
user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider” if certain conditions are met.
The service provider—in this instance, the online music retailer—cannot
“have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material

97. Under the tort theory of joint and several liability, “each liable party is individually
responsible for the entire obligation, but a paying party may have a right of contribution and
indemnity from nonpaying parties.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (9th ed. 2009). See also
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220–21 (1994) (“Joint and several liability applies
when there has been a judgment against multiple defendants. It can result in one defendant’s paying
more than its apportioned share of liability when the plaintiff’s recovery from other defendants is
limited by factors beyond the plaintiff’s control, such as a defendant’s insolvency. When the
limitations on the plaintiff’s recovery arise from outside forces, joint and several liability makes the
other defendants, rather than an innocent plaintiff, responsible for the shortfall” (citing Edmonds v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 271–71 (1979))).
98. Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2877–86 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006)).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 512(c). Section 512(a) applies to “[t]ransitory digital network communications”; §
512(b) creates immunity for system caching; and § 512(d) provides a safe harbor for search engines.
None of these applies in this example.
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on the system or network is infringing.”102 One must first identify the
“infringing activity”—options include the unauthorized adaptation of a
musical composition or the unauthorized distribution of the unauthorized
adaptation of the musical composition. Obviously, an online music
retailer would argue that it is the former, and a plaintiff would argue that
it is the latter.103 The online music retailer and the musician likely
agreed, however, that the retailer would store the digital file of the sound
recording on its server, enable customers to purchase copies of the digital
file for downloading, and receive a percentage of the sales. The website
is not merely an enabler or a repository of files. Additionally, it
voluntarily enters into agreements with musicians whereby it will
distribute phonorecords of sound recordings; thus, it infringes the
copyright. Finally, the music retailer selects the material appearing on its
website.104
The safe-harbor provision further requires that the provider of online
services “d[id] not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider ha[d] the right
and ability to control such activity.”105 An online music retailer would
fail this requirement as well. The retailer profits off the download and
has the ability to control the infringing activity—that is, the retailer has
the ability to remove the infringing song file from its website and not
make it available for download.106
Therefore, the fact that an online music store actively chooses the
material it sells and reaps a direct financial benefit from the sale of the
MP3 files may remove any hope of a safe harbor. It incurs the same
liability a brick-and-mortar store incurs; indeed, Apple has already faced
lawsuits for this form of infringement.107 As for a musician’s vicarious
liability due to the actions of the online music store, it is also the same as
it would be in the brick-and-mortar situation discussed previously.108

102. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
103. If the infringing activity is determined to be merely the unauthorized adaptation, then the
online music retailer is not a direct infringer and is eligible for the safe harbor. If, however, the
infringing activity is the unauthorized distribution, then the online music retailer is a direct infringer
and thus ineligible for the safe harbor.
104. See, e.g., Ethan Smith, Apple Finally Shares Beatles, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2010, at B1
(noting Apple’s success in obtaining the rights to sell the Beatles’ catalog on iTunes).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
106. The final requirement, contained in § 512(c)(1)(C), is also immaterial to our discussion as it
deals with the “service provider’s” response upon notification of infringing activity.
107. Tuan Nguyen, Apple Sued for Artistic Copyright Infringement, DAILYTECH (July 5, 2007,
4:10 PM), http://www.dailytech.com/Apple+Sued+for+Artistic+Copyright+Infringement/article
7933.htm.
108. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
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IV. HOW FAR DOWNSTREAM DO WE LOOK FOR INFRINGERS?
Public policy discourages liability for downstream infringement. In
several instances, Congress has specifically created statutory exemptions
for infringing uses by end-users of patented technology. For example, if
a medical practitioner performs a medical activity—such as a patented
surgical technique—that constitutes an infringement under the Patent
Act, neither the “infringing” medical practitioner nor the hospital or
facility that accommodated the surgery will face the provisions imposing
the remedies, injunctions, damages, and attorney’s fees.109
Downstream liability in patent law has also required notice of the
patent. “[W]here a patent is sold as a commercial product, an alleged
infringer is deemed to have ‘constructive notice’ of the patent protection
‘when the patentee consistently mark[s] substantially all of its patented
products’ with the statutory label.”110 If the items are not marked with
the patent number, or the mark is removed by an upstream seller, and
then “reintroduce[d] into the stream of commerce, [this action of
removing the mark] effectively immuniz[es] all subsequent purchasers
from . . . infringement damages.”111
In the case of the downstream consumer who is unaware of the
original copyright infringement by the defendant-musician, copyright
law could embrace patent-law doctrines regarding end-user immunity
and lack of notice.112 Just like the ignorant downstream user of
infringing patented technology, the purchasers of infringing songs could
be considered too far removed to be foreseeable defendants.113

109. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006).
110. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Co-op., Inc., 457 F.3d 1269, 1276 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(alteration in original) (quoting Sentry Prot. Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 918 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)).
111. Id.
112. When faced with similar circumstances, policies and concepts from one area of intellectualproperty law are often adopted by another. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434–35 (1984) (borrowing the express language in the Patent Act regarding third
party liability to similarly impose “liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have
not themselves engaged in the infringing activity,” namely vicarious liability and contributory
infringement).
113. Similarly, in negligence law, Mrs. Palsgraf was unable to obtain any relief after being
injured on a train platform by an exploding package because she was an unforeseeable victim too far
removed from the act of negligence to receive relief in the courts. Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R., 248
N.Y. 339, 346–47 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.). For a plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, “[t]he
damages must be so connected with the negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate
cause of the former.” Id. at 351 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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One must also question whether the mode of purchase should affect a
consumer’s liability for copyright infringement. As noted earlier,
purchasing a physical embodiment—such as a CD or vinyl record—does
not impose copyright-infringement liability on the consumer.114 To
declare that this same activity—changed only by how the copyrighted
work is fixed—now results in infringement seems grossly unjust.
Instead, “fundamental notions of fairness and legal process”115 should
dictate that the same rules apply to both brick-and-mortar transactions
and online purchases of music.
This unforeseen downstream-infringement liability could have
serious ramifications—pursuing consumers who believe they are legally
acquiring copies of songs could lead to unintended consequences
regarding the downloading and purchasing habits of the public. It could
push people toward illegal download sites—after all, why do the right
thing and pay for a legal download if one can still be sued? A consumer
may think that if he could be held liable for infringement because of the
conduct of a musician, he might as well just download songs for free in
an unauthorized transaction and make it more difficult to get caught.
After all, a transaction on iTunes is easier to trace—the website has the
customer’s name, address, and credit card information. For the illegal
download, a plaintiff may face a more difficult—if not impossible—task
of tracking down those individuals who use infringing peer-to-peer
downloading software.116 “More than one computer may be placed
under a single [Internet Protocol (IP) address]. Thus, it is possible that
the [Internet Service Provider (ISP)] may not be able to identify with any
specificity which of numerous users” who are attached to a specific IP
address at the time of the unauthorized download is the one who
allegedly infringed.117
Under such circumstances, providing the
plaintiffs with “a long list of possible infringers would” impermissibly
lead to a “fishing expedition.”118
114. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
115. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 212 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 178 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting that
when determining whether to grant a subpoena requesting the name, address, and other information
attached to an IP address, “the Court must consider whether the information sought can be
reasonably traced to a particular defendant”); Lemley & Reese, supra note 17, at 5 (“[T]he copyright
owner would need to provide evidence showing that the particular IP address in question was, at the
time in question, assigned to the person against whom the dispute is brought.”).
117. London-Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
118. Id. In Sony Music Entertainment Inc. v. Does 1–40, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York laid out a test for “evaluating subpoenas seeking identifying
information from ISPs regarding subscribers who are parties to litigation.” 326 F. Supp. 2d 556,
564–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Factors to weigh in balancing
the need for disclosure against First Amendment interests. . . . include: (1) a concrete
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V. CONTEMPLATING SOLUTIONS
As noted earlier, many reasons support protecting online purchasers
from downstream liability when the downloaded song infringes a
copyright. While courts could provide such protection, Congress should
amend the 1976 Act.
A. Is This Something the Courts Can Resolve?
Courts faced with consumer-infringement litigation may wish to
borrow the downstream-infringement doctrine from patent law and, in
this manner, limit consumer liability.119 It may be considered legislating
from the bench for courts to decide that this is a non-infringing use and
hold that the rights granted to copyright owners under the 1976 Act do
not include this kind of downstream activity; indeed, the First Circuit has
held that there was no such exception in the 1976 Act.120 The court
noted that while Congress made express exceptions to infringement
liability for solely personal and non-commercial use in the 1976 Act, it
had not done so for music downloading.121
As a second option, customers in a copyright-infringement action
could rely on jury nullification122 and hope that juries simply refuse to
impose liability for infringement under these circumstances. It would be
very risky, however, to rely on a jury’s taking such action.
Third, a consumer who incurs infringement liability for downloading
songs that she reasonably believed to be non-infringing may convince a
judge that statutory damages violate constitutional due process or
common law excessiveness.
The constitutional issue regarding
showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm; (2) specificity of the discovery
request; (3) the absence of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed information; (4) a
central need for the subpoenaed information to advance the claim; and (5) the party’s
expectation of privacy.
Id. (citations omitted). The district court designed the test to avoid a “fishing expedition” by
plaintiffs. London-Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 178; see also Boag, supra note 19, at 243–44
(discussing the privacy issues involved in subpoenaing ISPs for personal information of possible
defendants).
119. See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
120. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, Nos. 10-1883, 10-1947, 10-2052, 2011 WL
4133920, at *9–12 (1st Cir. Sept. 16, 2011).
121. Id. at *10.
122. Jury nullification can be defined as “render[ing] an acquittal . . . in disregard of the
governing law and the weight of the evidence.” Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans,
Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries,
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2003).
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excessiveness is unresolved.
Recently, in Sony BMG Music
Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, the First Circuit reversed a lower court’s
finding that a jury’s imposition of $675,000 in statutory damages for the
downloading of thirty songs violated the defendant’s constitutional right
against a jury award as “‘grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the
conscience of the court, or so high that it would be a denial of justice to
permit it to stand.’”123 The appellate court found that the constitutional
issue was decided prematurely,124 and that before considering “whether
the award violated due process[,] . . . [t]he district court should first have
considered the non-constitutional issue of remittitur, which may have
obviated any constitutional due process issue.”125 The appellate court
“reinstate[d] the jury’s award of damages”126 and remanded to the lower
court “for consideration of defendant’s motion for common law
remittitur based on excessiveness.”127 In our example, if a court upholds
a judgment of damages against the defendant class, or Caliber accepts a
remittitur, he would then have the task of collecting damages from the
one million defendants.128
B. Or Does This Require a Legislative Solution?
Courts have repeatedly stated that despite a law’s harsh and
unintended consequence, judges should refrain from legislating from the
bench.129 Thus, beyond the reduced statutory damages provided for
when “innocent infringement” has been proven to the satisfaction of the
court, action by Congress may be the prudent way to provide protection
for downstream consumers caught in this web.

123. 2011 WL 4133920, at *19, 21 (quoting Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1197 (1st Cir.
1995)). For further reading regarding the constitutionality of copyright statutory damages, see Colin
Morrissey, Note, Behind the Music: Determining the Relevant Constitutional Standard for Statutory
Damages in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3059 (2010).
124. Tenenbaum, 2011 WL 4133920, at *21.
125. Id. at *19.
126. Id. at *25.
127. Id. The appellate court noted that “[i]f, on remand, the court allows any reduction through
remittitur, then plaintiffs must be given the choice of a new trial or acceptance of remitter.” Id.
128. As discussed earlier, it is unclear whether this collection method would be allowed. See
supra Part III.A.
129. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc. 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005) (“[I]t is up
to Congress rather than the courts to fix [unintentional drafting gaps].”); United States v. Hopkins,
427 U.S. 123, 125 (1976) (per curiam) (“‘[I]t is up to Congress to remedy this apparent harsh
result . . . . [T]he courts should refrain from legislating by judicial fiat.’”) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Keetz v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 205, 207 (1964) (per curiam), superseded by
statute, Tucker Act Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. 91-350, § 1(b), 84 Stat. 449, as recognized by
Slattery v. United States, 635 F.3d 1298, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
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Any amendment to the 1976 Act that protects consumers in this
manner should be carefully worded so as to only cover downloads of
music for which there is a reasonable belief that the musical composition
in the sound recording fixed in the phonorecord does not infringe on any
other musical composition. Three alternatives could achieve this. The
first creates an exemption to infringement; the second and third amend §
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act regarding statutory damages. One alternative
to the § 504 amendment gives the courts discretion to reduce damages
even further than the $200 minimum now allowed. The other shifts the
burden to the plaintiff to show “non-innocent” infringement by the
consumer, and innocent infringement would again lead to discretionary
damages.
1. Legislatively Providing for Another Exception to Infringement
Under the 1976 Act
This first alternative exempts downstream consumers from
infringement. There are already several exceptions to the rights granted
in § 106, including exceptions for fair use,130 transfer of a lawful copy,131
and secondary transmissions.132 One could analogize the creation of a
bright-line exception for consumer downloads to the exception end
receivers of a program received through a secondary transmission under
§ 111 of the 1976 Act—when watching a favorite television show, one
assumes that the transmission was lawfully obtained by the cable or
satellite company from the broadcaster. In the situation outlined in this
Article, the consumer has a good-faith belief that the download
purchased from the online music store is an authorized phonorecord of
the sound recording and underlying musical composition. In the
alternative, rather than completely exempting downstream consumers
from liability, Congress could set the statutory damages for this situation
to a nominal amount.
Providing an exception to infringement for consumers would create a
bright-line rule for removing this unintended form of infringement. “In
deciding whether to adopt a bright-line rule or a loose standard, the
Supreme Court has considered who will need to apply the legal rule, and
in what context.” 133 The Fifth Circuit has noted that:
130. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
131. Id. § 109.
132. Id. § 111.
133. Jesse Leigh Jenike-Godshalk, Note, Appealed Denials and Denied Appeals: Finding a
Middle Ground in the Appellate Review of Denials of Summary Judgment Following a Full Trial on
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[W]hen lines are drawn sufficiently sharp in their definitional edges to
be reasonable and predictable, such differing results are the inevitable
result—indeed, decisions are the desired product. . . . [B]y making
results more predictable, [bright line rules] serve[] a normative
function. [They] operate[] as a rule of law and allow[] a court to
adjudicate rather than manage.134

A bright-line rule “has the virtue of predictability with the vice of
creating results in cases at its edge that are said to be ‘unjust’ or
‘unfair.’”135 As a disadvantage, bright-line rules can lead to “seemingly
perverse results.”136 For example, consumers caught up in the web of the
two musicians involved in an infringement suit over a copyrighted song
currently fall on the infringement side of a bright line, which turns them
into unintended downstream infringers—this can be viewed as a perverse
result of this bright line of strict liability.137 Another bright-line rule
excepting this behavior from infringement liability may be the
appropriate remedy.
2. Amending the Statutory Damages Provision Under § 504 to Provide
for Greater Judicial Discretion
This second option amends the provision regarding statutory
damages—specifically § 504(c)(2)138—to provide greater judicial
discretion regarding remedies.
Congress could enact legislation
providing for one of several alternatives. Courts could (1) receive
authority to absolve the defendant of any monetary liability; (2) retain
the discretion to limit damages to a nominal amount; or (3) require only
that the innocent infringer delete all copies of the infringing song file.
Such discretion would provide consumers with some sense of relief and
the Merits, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1595, 1620 (2010).
134. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(citing Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 396 (1978)).
135. Id.; see also Elizabeth Cosenza, Dura-tion: A New Paradigm for Construing the Statute of
Limitations in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 724, 725 (2010) (arguing
that the Supreme Court has an “interest in promoting judicial economy and certainty in the law
through the application of a bright-line rule of liability” because it “eases the burden on the judiciary
and offers predictive value to those who provide services to participants in the securities business”).
136. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1029.
137. Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing E.
Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 415 (S.D. N.Y. 2000)) (noting that
copyright infringement is a tort of strict liability).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006) (“In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving,
and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her
acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.”).
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certainty that, should they face infringement claims, the court may
reduce or eliminate any liability for monetary damages.
One must bear in mind, however, that “as is always the case when an
issue is committed to judicial discretion, the judge’s decision must be
supported by a circumstance that has relevance to the issue at hand.”139
Justice Ginsberg has “observed that ‘unlimited jury [or judicial]
discretion . . . may invite extreme results that jar one’s constitutional
sensibilities.’”140 Thus, the downside to legislating greater judicial
discretion regarding statutory damages is the possibility of extreme
results unintended by Congress.
In addition, “workability is a fundamental concern for any legal
standard or test.”141 Any statutorily granted judicial discretionary
allowance would need to be workable by the courts. One of the
difficulties of providing for greater judicial discretion “is that it often
requires difficult factual inquiries and subjective policy judgments which
are more appropriate for legislative, rather than judicial,
determination.”142
Also, a judge’s reduction of damages still requires a trip to the
courthouse by the downstream consumer, and it may be easier to settle
than to hope that a sympathetic judge hears the case. Legal fees would
accrue even if the defendant is successful, and a settlement may occur
regardless. Thus, providing for judicial discretion regarding damages
may not eliminate the threat of potential collateral damage of deterring
consumers from legally downloading new music.
3. Amending the Statutory Damages Provision Under § 504 to Shift the
Burden of Proof
A third alternative would be for Congress to amend § 504 to shift the
burden of proof regarding innocent infringement from defendant to
plaintiff. Currently, the onus is on the defendant to prove innocent
infringement.143 In the case of a consumer downloading a song from a

139. City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 196 n.8 (1995) (citing
Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982)).
140. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 430 (2003) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
141. Jenike-Godshalk, supra note 133, at 1620. Despite disadvantages, “a bright-line rule may
be preferable. Even for trained legal professionals, some tests may be so complicated or unclear that
they do not provide enough guidance or that they even become unworkable.” Id.
142. Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D. Conn. 1977).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
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website that was authorized to sell the song from the defendant-musician,
however, the burden could instead shift to the plaintiff to prove “noninnocent” infringement. If Congress chose to enact one or several of the
other alternatives discussed in Part V.B as well, then a plaintiff’s failure
to meet his burden of proof could lead to either zero or negligible
monetary damages.
Shifting the burden of proof would mean that the plaintiff would
have a higher overall hurdle to meet for downstream consumers who
purchase infringing songs.144 This may parallel the initial burden placed
on copyright owners proceeding with take-down requests under the
DMCA. In Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., the court found that in order
for a copyright owner to proceed with a take-down notice under the
DMCA, there must be “‘a good faith belief that use of the material in the
manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its
agent, or the law’ [and] the owner must evaluate whether the material
makes fair use of the copyright.”145 Similarly, in order to collect more
than nominal damages, the statute could require a plaintiff suing
consumers for downloading an infringing song from an online music
retailer to show that the consumer’s actions were not those of an
“innocent infringer.” The plaintiff-musician would still have a claim
against the infringing musician for every downloaded song, as well as
against the online music retailer, but both of these defendants have
greater resources at their disposal and are more cognizant of the risks
than the downstream consumer. Additionally, the online music retailer
and the infringing musician are in a better position to negotiate for the
possibility of an infringement lawsuit by the copyright owner regarding
the alleged infringement.146
Both allowing for more judicial discretion in awarding damages and
shifting the burden of “innocent infringement” to the plaintiff, however,
could lead to forum shopping and inconsistent results in different
jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions may be more inclined to find in favor
of consumer defendants and others less likely. Our system of justice
seeks to discourage forum shopping and avoids inequitable

144. For a general discussion of this burden-shifting for a determination of non-fair use for
effective DMCA notices, see Benjamin Wilson, Notice, Takedown, and the Good-Faith Standard:
How to Protect Internet Users from Bad-Faith Removal of Web Content, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 613 (2010).
145. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v)).
146. For example, an online music retailer may decide to negotiate for an indemnification clause
in its agreement with musicians who wish to sell songs on the website.
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administration of the law.147 This burden-shifting approach may resolve the
issue, but could also result in undesired consequences.
Of the options discussed above—both judicial and legislative—
which one is the recommended approach? All have pros and cons
associated with them. As noted previously, leaving it to the courts to
declare that consumers were not intended infringers or to sua sponte
reduce damages below the statutory minimums are not prudent solutions.
A court will not wish to disturb a jury’s finding. Indeed, hoping for a
solution in the courts could also lead to bullying by the copyright owner
through the threat of a lawsuit—a consumer is more likely to settle with
the copyright owner than defend the suit in court.
Therefore, sensible courses of action include adding an exemption to
infringement liability under § 501 of the 1976 Act or amending § 504 to
reduce or eliminate liability for monetary damages.

VI. CONCLUSION
While some musicians may pursue consumers for this form of
infringement, many others may not. Some artists see any use of their
music by someone other than themselves as unacceptable,148 while others
may choose to only seek remuneration from the infringing musician.
Music downloading has become the dominant way to purchase songs,
and with so many consumers who could be affected, inconsistent
enforcement could have a profound and widespread effect that extends
beyond copyright law. Inconsistent enforcement against downstream
consumer infringers could weaken our overall fidelity to the law. In
addition, if infringement suits are brought against defendants who
believe they are lawfully downloading songs, consumers may see little
difference—and less risk—in downloading a song legally versus
illegally.149 Taken to an extreme, this seemingly absurd form of
infringement litigation could erode some basic tenets of our society—
namely our respect for the rule of law.

147. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965).
148. For example, Prince is notorious in his attempts to control any and all uses of his music.
See Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. “Prince [has] spoke[n] publicly about his efforts ‘to reclaim his
art on the internet’ and threatened to sue several internet service providers for alleged infringement
of his music copyrights.” Id. (citing Mike Collett-White, Prince to Sue YouTube, eBay Over Music
Use, REUTERS, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/09/14/us-prince-youtubeidUSL1364328420070914?fepdtype=RSS&FeedName_InternetNews&rpc=22&sp=true).
149. See supra Part IV.

30

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

In his article, Changes in American Veneration for the Rule of Law,
James Gibson posits that Americans firmly support the rule of law as
crucial for an effective democracy.150 He notes that consistency is at the
heart of this concept:
Where power is arbitrary, personal, and unpredictable, the citizenry
will not know how to behave; it will fear that any action could produce
an unforeseen risk. Essentially, the rule of law means: (1) that
people . . . will be treated equally by the institutions administering the
law—the courts, the police, and the civil service; and (2) that people
and institutions can predict with reasonable certainty the consequences
of their actions, at least as far as the state is concerned.151

“But the rule of law is more than a set of institutions, a constitution,
or a book of statutes.
Indeed, perhaps [its] most important
manifestation . . . is its representation in a nation’s culture—the beliefs,
expectations, values, and attitudes held by [a country’s citizens].”152
Indeed, Gibson points to Professor Martin Krygier’s admonition that the
rule of law holds manifest and fundamental importance based on “‘a
widespread assumption within society that law matters and should
matter.’”153 As a society, we abhor regimes in which arbitrary laws are
created and administered at the whim of its leader with little or no
constraint, such as Iraq when it was ruled by the late Saddam Hussein or
the former Soviet Union under the control of the late Joseph Stalin.
Lack of faith that the rule of law will be followed—by either a
country’s government or its citizens—may erode confidence, discourage
corporations from conducting business, and in the situation described in
this Article, deter consumers from purchasing new musical compositions.
If consumers no longer purchase legal downloads of new music154—
either foregoing any download or, in the alternative, downloading the
song in an infringing manner—this could affect the business models of
recording companies, purveyors of music scores, and retail stores.155 If

150. 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 593, 593 (2007).
151. Id. at 596 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites
of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 15 (1994)).
152. Id. at 598.
153. Id. (quoting Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections After the Collapse of
Communism, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 633, 646 (1990)).
154. New musical compositions—and the sound recordings thereof—are the songs most likely to
be subjects of infringement suits. Older songs have passed the “test of time” and are less likely to be
infringing.
155. See generally Daniel J. Wakin, Free Trove of Music Scores on Web Hits Sensitive
Copyright Note, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011 at A1 (noting the effect of open-source websites offering
music scores on traditional publishers).
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consumers choose to forgo any download, then new artists would be
stifled in their ability to have their music proliferated among the masses,
contrary to the purpose of the 1976 Act.156
When contemplating the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress never
intended to transform everyone who buys a best-selling song into an
infringer because it is later discovered that the downloaded musical
composition is infringing another.157 One should seriously question
whether casting an infringement net around large masses of consumers
who have made purchases in good faith is the kind of behavior society
wishes to encourage.

156. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994) (“The primary objective of the [1976]
Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good
of the public.”).
157. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.

